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Fighting Irregular Fighters

Defeating Violent Nonstate Actors
Robert J. Bunker
Abstract: The role of landpower “at war” is as integral to US defense needs as landpower “short of war.” But what about the role
of landpower between these two in environments in which violent
nonstate actors dominate? In such cases, it is best to devolve opposing violent nonstate actors as quickly as possible so policing forces
can implement follow-on strategies. Landpower can help provide
security conditions under which these strategies can be facilitated.
And just like their allies in Al Qaeda, this new Taliban is more network than
army, more of a community of interest than a corporate structure.
GEN Stanley A. McChrystal1

L

andpower represents the application of force generated by
conventional militaries—be they classical Roman legionnaires,
medieval European knights, or modern US soldiers. Such power
is generated by land forces, essentially the “[p]ersonnel, weapon systems,
vehicles, and support elements operating on land to accomplish assigned
missions and tasks.”2 Boots-on-the-ground integrated into Brigade
Combat Teams (BCTs) represents our state-of-the art operational
approach to ground combat operations. In turn, official publications
define landpower and what it influences:
[L]and power. . . . The ability—by threat, force, or occupation—to gain,
sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people. [It is] the
primary means to impose the Nation’s will on an enemy, by force when
necessary; establish and maintain a stable environment that sets the conditions for political and economic development; . . . . .3

The integral nature of landpower “at war” to US defense needs—
essentially in interstate war—is well recognized, as is the role of the
United Sates Army as the nation’s principal land force.4 The contribution of landpower “short of war”—for influence, deterrence, and
humanitarian purposes—is also well accepted. More problematic is the
relationship of landpower to environments in which violent nonstate
actors dominate. Far less obvious is the role of landpower in irregular
warfare, intrastate war waged by belligerents who are not states—along
with its attendant organized criminal, illicit economic, and governmental
corruption components.5 The lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan suggest
1     Stanley A. McChrystal, “It Takes a Network: The New Front Line of Modern Warfare,”
Foreign Policy (March-April 2011), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/22/
it_takes_a_network.
2     Via JP 3-31. See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated
Terms, Joint Publication 1-02. November 8, 2010 (As Amended Through 16 July 2013): 163, http://
www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.
3     U.S. Department of the Army, The U.S. Army Capstone Concept, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0,
(Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 19, 2012), 38, 39.
4     Ibid.
5     Odierno, Amos, and McRaven, Strategic Landpower, 3.

Dr. Robert J. Bunker is
a Distinguished Visiting
Professor and Minerva
Chair at the Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War
College. He is also Adjunct
Faculty, Department of
Politics and Economics,
Claremont Graduate Univ. He
has published, coauthored, and
edited publications in numerous venues. He is currently
focused on dark globalization
and new forms of insurgency.

58

Parameters 43(4) Winter 2013-14

that, while operational successes in such campaigns may be won at a
high cost in US treasure, they are not economically sustainable. Further,
the strategic goals of those campaigns—the desired results which would
fulfill the multinational security objectives—could only be partially met.
While the Ba’athist and Taliban governments have been removed from
power—and more importantly al Qaeda forces decimated—both states
are fragile, suffer from tribal and sectarian violence, and are beset with
dysfunctional governments. At best, the campaigns waged in Iraq and
Afghanistan can be considered only partial victories, at worst, partial
failures.6
With these perceptions in mind, this article will look at the relationship of landpower to violent nonstate actors. In order to do this,
these actors first will be characterized along with their landpower-like
attributes. Second, an overview of state policing and military forces will
be provided. Third, landpower-related application strategies will be discussed. This article will end with some lessons concerning the need for
networks when confronting violent nonstate actors and will provide a
few cautionary remarks about “democratic capacity building” in the age
of austerity now upon us.

Violent Nonstate Actors

The threats represented by violent nonstate actors are as old as
the earliest states. Bandits, raiders, and pirates have plagued civilized
peoples around the globe for millennia. A contemporary view of these
actors is that they exist along a threat continuum from that of common
criminals to criminal-soldiers (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Violent Nonstate Actor Continuum
Criminals are at the left side of the continuum and are characterized as
having limited violence and corruption capabilities. Gangs, organized
crime, and less sophisticated cartels are representative of these more
benign and somewhat less violent actors, as are robbers, brigands, and
pirates. Criminals do not openly challenge police forces and have a
parasitic relationship with a state; they seek to be left alone to engage in
various nefarious activities and profit from the illicit economy.
Criminal-soldiers, nonstate soldiers, or illegal combatants, are at the
right side of the continuum and are characterized as having high violence
6     For the debate on war ending models vis-à-vis al Qaeda, Afghanistan, and Iraq, see James M.
Dubik, “Ringing True or Ringing Hollow?” Army, August 2013, 18-20.
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and corruption capability. Organized into private armies—as opposed
to the public armies fielded by states—the more evolved actors are
increasingly landpower-like in their attributes. Sicarios (cartel assassins
and enforcers), insurgents, warlords, and mafias in uniform all represent
landpower forces to varying degrees. As an example, a Los Zetas commando unit operating in the Mexican state of Tamaulipas, composed of
a couple dozen armored sports-utility vehicles with mounted infantry in
body armor and carrying small arms, definitely meets the Department
of Defense definition of a land force.7
The major threat criminal-soldiers present is that their relationship
to the state is not a parasitic one like that of common criminals. Rather,
they can be viewed as challengers and successors to the state. Via one
process, the synergistic employment of violence and corruption, plato
o plomo (silver or lead in Spanish), results in areas of impunity. These,
in turn, lead to de facto shifts in governance by criminal organizations.
Via another better known process, insurgents actively create a parallel
shadow government to challenge and ultimately replace state institutions while carrying out targeted violence and assassination campaigns.
Ultimately, if a violent nonstate actor has the financial resources to field
a private army, it has “warmaking capability” which, in turn, means it
has state capturing or making potentials.8
It should be noted that terrorists represent a blended case along
the continuum as some of them exhibit high violence potential—as
in the case of the early al Qaeda spectaculars—but possess low corruptive capability. Further, most such groups are considered no better
than criminals. Still, the blurred nature of transnational organizations
such as al Qaeda brings us to three other facts about these increasingly significant and deadly actors. First, violent nonstate actors have
been merging and blending for quite some time. Components of the al
Qaeda network, and even those belonging to some of the more dominant Mexican cartels, exhibit gang, terrorist, insurgent, and organized
criminal behaviors and patterns simultaneously.9 Second, violent nonstate actors are evolving towards more networked organizational forms
but can manifest hierarchical, blended, and networked features. When
under pressure from competing actors and states, they tend to devolve
into networks as a defensive response—when dominant in a host environment more centralization becomes evident. Third, their numbers
appear to be increasing as an outcome of external stressors placed on
states due to the unexpected components of globalization, rapidly evolving technologies, and biosphere degradation (e.g., climatic changes).10

7     See JP 1-02 (footnote 2).
8     Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Bringing the State Back
In, ed. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschmeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1985), 169-191.
9     Michael Miklaucic and Jacqueline Brewer, eds., Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in
the Age of Globalization (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2013); Jennifer L. Hesterman,
The Terrorist-Criminal Nexus: An Alliance of International Drug Cartels, Organized Crime, and Terror Groups
(Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2013).
10     The tipping point may have been reached now that at least one security scholar is suggesting
an alternative to the state-centric paradigm—one in which some armed nonstate groups are now
viewed as a positive force for global stability. See Robert Mandel, Global Security Upheaval: Armed
Nonstate Groups Usurping State Stability Functions (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013).
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State Policing and Military Forces

Police and military forces represent the coercive public agencies
fielded by a state. Each force is meant to have a clear-cut institutional
role with police utilized for intrastate crime prevention and the military
utilized for interstate warfare to protect the state from opposing state
militaries. A contemporary perspective on these forces can be seen in
Figure 2, State Forces Continuum.

Figure 2. State Forces Continuum.
Police forces exist on the left side of this continuum and focus on
crime prevention and the arrest of lawbreakers. Police utilize criminal
intelligence procedures and typically work singularly or in pairs to complete their functions. While these forces are tactically adept, they have
never developed or needed operational level capabilities. Community,
patrol, line policing, and detective and investigative police units operate
at the municipal, regional, and federal levels and are representative of
these anticrime-focused activities. While police possess a low antiviolence capability—they are not meant or configured to confront armed
and organized opposition forces—due to their investigative expertise,
they possess a high anticorruption capability, especially within federal
policing agencies.11
Military forces operate on the right side of the State Forces
Continuum and are tasked with the mission of defeating opposing
state-based military forces. The focus of these forces is that of organized destruction and killing under the condition of war between states.
Since military forces oppose sentient opponents, they rely on military
intelligence to understand enemy intent, capabilities, and futures. Core
Army landpower forces are composed of airborne, mountain, and light
and heavy mechanized units at the brigade level. While the military
possesses a low anticorruption capability—it is not meant or configured
to engage in investigative policing—it possesses a high antiviolence
11     Of course, when the policing agencies of a violent nonstate actor host country are corrupted,
serious conditions result. While in some countries the military is less corrupt than the police, the
military does not have the ability to root out corruption so impunity still results.
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capability far greater than the landpower-like capabilities of the more
threatening violent nonstate actors.
The middle region of the continuum (Figure 2) represents the blurred
zone of high intensity crime, low intensity conflict, and other crime-war
descriptive constructs—it requires the fielding of both blended and
specialized police and military forces. Domestic law enforcement has
fielded Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams and bomb squads
to contend with heavily armed criminals who use barricade techniques,
are willing to confront law enforcement in limited firefights, and
employ improvised explosive devices (IEDs).12 Internationally, formed
police units are employed. On the armed forces side, military police
and explosive ordnance disposal units engage in law enforcement and
antiterrorist (and anti-insurgent) activities. Further, infantry units armed
with less lethal weapons have been utilized for crowd control and antiriot missions. In turn, Special Forces—representing an unconventional
landpower force—have been heavily tasked since 9/11 to directly engage
specific violent nonstate actors around the globe. One of the ongoing
problems for state forces tasked to contend with these actors is that
stovepipes exist concerning our response—such as countergang groups
work separately from counternarcotics groups who, in turn, work separately from counterterrorism groups.13 This issue can become even more
pronounced at the interstate level between cooperating state forces,
especially between the American military and foreign police agencies.
In addition to the rise of state-based forces found in the middle of
the state forces continuum, we are seeing the proliferation of private
security and private military corporations contracting with states much
like Swiss mercenaries and Italian condottieri did five hundred years
ago. While many of these actors are our “allies”—at least while the
money lasts—some of them are amoral parties which can be purchased
by the highest bidder while others contract exclusively for threat forces
composed of the larger violent nonstate actors.14

Landpower and Violent Nonstate Actors

Landpower may be applied appropriately and inappropriately against
violent nonstate actors and in their host environments at the strategic

12     This militarization of the police/bringing military concepts into policing has been both condemned and advocated. See, for example, Radley Bilko, Rise of the Warrior Cop: The Militarization
of America’s Police Forces (New York: Public Affairs, 2013) and Charles ‘Sid’ Heal, Field Command
(Brooklyn: Lantern Books, 2012) respectively. Further, debates on how to best employ foreign
police forces for conflict environments exist. For instance, see David H. Bayley and Robert M.
Perito, The Police in War: Fighting Insurgency, Terrorism, and Violent Crime (Boulder: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 2010) and John P. Sullivan, “The Missing Mission: Expeditionary Police for Peacekeeping
and Transnational Stability,” Small Wars Journal, May 9, 2007, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/
the-missing-mission-expeditionary-police-for-peacekeeping-and-transnational-stability.
13     Robert J. Bunker, “The Mexican Cartel Debate: As Viewed Through Five Divergent Fields of
Security Studies,” Small Wars Journal—El Centro, February 11, 2011, http://smallwarsjournal.com/
jrnl/art/the-mexican-cartel-debate. As violent nonstate actor forms increasingly blur and merge, we
are starting to see better state forces integration.
14     Graham Hall Turbiville, Jr., “Outlaw Private Security Firms: Criminal and Terrorist Agendas
Undermine Private Security Agendas.” Global Crime 7, no. 3-4 (August-November 2006): 561-582.
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level.15 Inappropriate strategic application may result in foreign policy
failure and even potentially contribute to diminished US national power
via open-ended conflicts which place a substantial and ongoing burden
on our defense budgets. In violent nonstate actors’ focused strategies,
landpower forces may have a sizeable and direct role; however, the preference is to devolve the opposing actors as safely and quickly as possible
for policing forces to increasingly take the lead in implementing the
more encompassing strategies. These strategies are as follows:16
•• Limited Punitive Strateg y: Of all of the strategies directed against violent
nonstate actors, this is the most limited one. It principally seeks to
deter certain actions that these groups are taking or may be planning
to take by means of symbolic forms of punishment directed against
them. For land forces, this can range from stand-off targeting of assets
and personnel for destruction (via supporting drone strikes) through
the seizure or destruction of those assets and personnel via raids. An
example of this strategy would be engaging in a hypothetical raid
against a coastal pirate town on the Somali coast.
•• Disruption and Neutralization Strateg y: This can be considered a “render
safe” strategy—the intent is to ensure that the violent nonstate actors
have been sufficiently weakened so they are unable to export violence,
such as terrorism, outside the host country or to regions of the host
country not under their control. Any combination of physical assets;
infrastructure, materiel, finances, personnel, and organizational cohesion; and leader and factional/cell cohesion can be targeted by means
of this strategy. While a foreign terrorist organization attrited in this
manner has not been eliminated, its capacity to attack US interests will
be severely degraded until it is able to reconstitute itself.
•• Co-option and Reintegration Strateg y: The intent of this strategy is to rely on
persuasion and soft power to either “buy off” (e.g., via bribes and payments) or actually reintegrate personnel into the societal mainstream
by means of political enfranchisement, ideological rehabilitation,
amnesty, and job training and employment programs. Rehabilitation
programs have been successfully carried out in Saudi Arabia and
within some other states.17 The role of land power forces within this
strategy is limited with their serving more in an auxiliary security and
protection role.
•• Termination Strateg y: This strategy seeks to eliminate a specific organization by dismantling it principally by coercive military and policing
15     A separate analysis can also be made of landpower forces applied against violent nonstate
actors at the operational level. Inappropriate operational application may result in military failure
and loss of indigenous population support. Applying landpower at the operational level should follow the logic of proportionality, economy of force, and network response integration with policing
forces. See Steven Metz, The Future of Insurgency (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army
War College, December 10, 1993) concerning the “commercial insurgency” construct and John P.
Sullivan, “Transnational Gangs: The Impact of Third Generation Gangs in Central America,” Air &
Space Power Journal (Second Trimester 2008), http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/apjinternational/
apj-s/2008/2tri08/sullivaneng.htm, concerning DIME-P.
16     Army thinking is constantly evolving. Unified land operations have replaced the concept of
wide spectrum operations. Proposed strategies extend the CONOPS by unifying military operations
with policing operations. U.S. Department of the Army, Unified Land Operations, Army Doctrine
Reference Publication (ADRP) 3.0 (Washington DC: U.S. Department of the Army, May 16, 2012).
17     See the report prepared by the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism
Research (ICPTVR) and the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG), International Conference
on Terrorist Rehabilitation (ICTR), February 24-26, 2009, Singapore, http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/
Report/RSIS_ICTR_Report_2009.pdf.
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activities. This requires an ongoing boots-on-the-ground presence
and may require years to achieve success. This is also dependent
on the size and sophistication of the targeted actor, its penetration
into local society, termination strategy resources allocated, and local
environmental conditions present (e.g., cross border sanctuaries). A
good example was the intent of Operation Enduring Freedom in
Afghanistan to eliminate al Qaeda and Taliban organizations within
that host country.
Potential inhibitors of these strategies include the fact that a specific
targeted actor can move to another location, or is already transnational
in nature and exists simultaneously in many locations. Thus, the
potential transnational existence of these threats requires the possible
fielding of landpower and policing forces in multiple national locales.
Additionally, some violent groups are heavily networked and exhibit
a biological reconstitution capacity—like starfish growing back a lost
limb—which makes them resilient to targeting.18 Unintended second
and third order effects of these targeting strategies may also result in
unwanted outcomes.19
Another major spoiler of these strategies is the fact that if a targeted
actor is weakened or eliminated, a vacuum may develop in the host
environment. This condition is readily evident in host environments in
lower socio-economic regions in which the illicit economy, lack of governmental authority, and dysfunctional patterns of human organization
dominate. Neutralizing or eliminating a specific gang, cartel, or warlord
group simply allows for a competitor, successor, or new organization to
fill the void. In host environment alteration focused strategies, the role
of landpower forces is that of a facilitator—they may help to provide
the domestic security conditions under which these strategies can be
facilitated—but are not the primary implementers of state building or
strengthening regimes.20 These strategies, integral to responding to
“wars among the people” and the recognition of the human domain of
warfare, are as follows:21
•• Stability and Support Strateg y: The intent of this strategy is to stabilize the
host environment—typically a fragile or failed city, region, or state—so
it does not deteriorate further. Putting an end to sectarian and violent
nonstate actor violence by providing peace enforcement activities and
humanitarian aid to the local populace to satisfy basic living needs
(food, water, clothing, shelter, etc.) are the typical objectives. It should
be noted implementation of this strategy will not fundamentally alter
the host environment which will remain favorable to violent nonstate
actor sustainment.
•• Limited State Building Strateg y: This strategy promotes the creation of
18     For more about starfish (networked) organizations, see Ori Brafman and Rod A. Beckstrom,
The Starfish and the Spider (New York: Portfolio, 2006).
19     The deportations of Los Angeles street gang members in the 1990s who were illegal
immigrants to Central America gave rise to the Maras (MS-13 and M-18) in El Salvador and
neighboring countries.
20     In ungoverned spaces, the reality is that the military has had to fill the governance void or
risk mission failure. This mission is better left to U.S. Department of State (USDOS), United States
Agency for International Development (USAID), and related agencies.
21     Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (New York: Vintage,
2008) and Charles T. Cleveland and Stuart L. Farris, “Toward Strategic Landpower,” Army, July
2013, 20-23.

64

Parameters 43(4) Winter 2013-14

a functioning and somewhat legitimate state. This result extends
beyond just the protection of the indigenous people and providing
for their basic survival needs. Other components of modern society
will be developed to one degree or another including a functioning
civil service, education and schooling, employment opportunities in
the formal economy, social welfare, and entertainment and sports
programs. No provision for free and democratic elections, the enfranchisement of women, or limitations on state corruption or police
excesses exists. Still, the host environment created will be less favorable to violent nonstate actor sustainment than that found in fragile
and failed regions.
•• Democratic Capacity Building Strateg y: The conceptual model behind this
strategy is almost seventy years old and is derived from the American
experience with post-war Germany and Japan. In both instances,
authoritarian governments were unconditionally defeated and the
conquered indigenous populations were “societally reengineered”
over the course of decades into modern democracies. Conceptual
extensions of this strategy include the reconstitution of former East
Germany and other Eastern European countries into democratic
states with the end of the Cold War and its attempted implementation
in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last dozen years with very mixed
results.22 Democratic states are viewed as producing fewer and more
benign forms of violent nonstate actors than other host environments.

Conclusion

As this article has explained, landpower—in terms of conventional,
general purpose formations (brigade combat teams)—is not the primary
solution for contending with violent nonstate actors. In fact, given our
recent experiences:
The application of military force in its current form has limited utility when
fighting modern wars among the people…Strategic victory requires a wider
understanding of “forces” that includes the military and nonmilitary.23

While landpower forces may indeed have a sizeable and direct role
in some strategies, the better choice is to utilize policing forces—both
specialized and general ones—as safely and as quickly as feasible.24 In
some instances, however, specialized US Army constabulary forces may
be required as an initial stabilizing force. Further, concerning host environment targeted strategies, landpower may help provide the domestic
security conditions under which they can be facilitated, but it should not
be the primary implementers of those conditions.
In the Iraqi and Afghani campaign theaters, lessons learned include
the view that, “It takes a network to defeat a network,” and “The
network [our network] needed to include everyone relevant who was

22     Concerning the need to shift from the current strategy of regime change followed by
stability operations see Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., “Strategy in a Time of Austerity,” Foreign Affairs
(November-December 2012): 58-69.
23     Cleveland and Farris, “Toward Strategic Landpower,” 23.
24     Police forces are not only more appropriate against many violent nonstate actors, they are
vastly cheaper to field and sustain than landpower forces.
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operating within the battlespace.”25 Such networks have been coordinated principally by the US military and portray the entrepreneurship
and adaptability of our landpower forces in the face of new and evolving
nonstate threats. Still, as has been discussed, larger strategic issues are
now in play. Our recent campaigns have taken us into conflicts that
were fertile, such as Afghanistan, or became fertile, such as Iraq, host
environments for violent nonstate actor emergence and sustenance. We
are also observing these host environments emerge in former autocratic
states such as Mexico, Libya, and Egypt, and in potentially transitioning
ones such as a Syria gripped by civil war. In a sense, two paths from
autocracy now exist—the preferable and hoped-for democratic one and
the one dominated by violent nonstate actors who fill the vacuum of
governance vacated by former institutions of an autocratic state.
The attempted transition of autocratic states is indicative of the major
issues at hand. Intervening states deploying land and policing forces are
increasingly finding themselves in a dilemma when confronting violent
nonstate actors. Focused strategies are actor-specific and even when that
actor is eliminated or reintegrated into the political process, a successor
or new actor typically emerges. Host environment alteration strategies,
on the other hand, are meant to alleviate the conditions under which
these actors breed and grow. These strategies exist at a level beyond
the use of land and policing forces and seek to engage in societal reengineering in failed, fragile, and transitioning states. US governmental
programs to facilitate any form of limited state—let alone democratic
capacity—building have not been up to the monumental tasks required,
even when flush with monies. As a result, US attempts at both eliminating violent nonstate actors and denying them host environments have
been mostly studies in failure.
This fact brings us back to the contemporary problem we now face.
Our recent attempts at “democratic capacity building” in host environments have been far from successful and—given the age of austerity
faced by the United States Army, its sister services, and the United
States government writ large—we no longer have the resources nor the
political will to engage in such long-term and expensive endeavors. This
reality suggests that strategic victory in some of these environments is
presently unattainable. To conserve finite elements of national power,
more cost-effective forms of counter strategies—based on some form
of global violent nonstate actor containment and mitigation protocol—
should be considered.

25     McChrystal, “It Takes a Network.” For theory and more information on this topic, see the
netwar writings of John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt.

